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RECENT CASES
ADMNISTRATIVE LAW-WAGE

CLAIM or RETIRED RAnaOAD
EMPLOYEE HELD SUBJECT TO PRIMARY JUISDICTI1 oF NATIONAL
RAIROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD; PRIOR RECOURSE TO BOARD FOR

REDPSS oF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE HELD

To PRECLUDE AcTIoN

FOR DAMAGES

In a retired railroad employee's action against the railroad in a federal
district court, predicated upon diversity of citizenship and seeking extra
compensation allegedly accumulated for special services beyond the employee's defined "switching limits" under a collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court of the United States held that retired employees
stand for purposes of the Railway Labor Act ' on the same footing as active
employees, and that the claim must be dismissed as within the exclusive
primary jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548 (1959).2 In a case decided the same
day, in which a former railroad employee had brought a diversity action
for damages for wrongful discharge after unsuccessfully challenging the
legality of his firing by a claim for reinstatement with back pay before the
Board, the Court construed the provision of section 3 First (m) of the act
that Board "awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the
dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award," 3 as foreclosing judicial reconsideration of a money claim first submitted by the
employee to the Board but wholly rejected by it on the grounds that the
allegedly wrongful railroad action was justified and therefore noncompensable. Union Pacific R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959). Dissenting
Justices in Day pointed out that the effect of the decisions, read in conjunction with section 3 First (p) of the Railway Labor Act which provides
for the enforcement of Board awards against reluctant railroads only
through the mechanism of a judicial trial de novo in which the Board's
findings and orders are prima facie evidence of the facts they relate, may be
first to force the aggrieved employee to press his money claim before the
agency and then to deny him a judicial review of adverse Board action
which would, however, be available to the employer in the same action.
' Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64
(1958).
2 The district court had stayed proceedings pending NRAB disposition of similar
claims pressed under the same bargaining agreement by other employees; then, after
an agency determination adverse to claimants the court had dismissed plaintiff's
complaint. The court of appeals reversed, holding that plaintiff could not be bound
by proceedings to which he was not a party.
3Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m) (1958).
(735)
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This federal closing of the courts to reexamination of administrative claims
sounding essentially in common-law assumpsit was regarded by the dissenters as too closely threatening the employee's seventh amendment right
of jury trial 4 to permit such an interpretation of the interlocking provisions of the congressional scheme.
Under the Railway Labor Act of 1934, the divisions of the National
Railroad Adjustment Board 5 are composed of equal numbers of railroad
and union representatives and in case of deadlock, an additional impartial
member," who sit to resolve disputes between employees and carriers arising from interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. 7 Railroad
employees who have chosen first to take their grievances before the Board
have consistently been denied a subsequent judicial trial, either upon the
"final and binding" provision of section 3 First (m) operative propio
vigore,s or upon the rationale that the employee's voluntary initial submission of the dispute to administrative action constituted an election of
remedies which worked to bring into play section 3 First (m)'s explicit

exclusionary language. 9

Impliedly limiting the presupposition of election

on which this latter theory rested, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction had
generally been applied to bar a priorcourt action seeking any redress which
the Board was capable of providing, 10 although, prior to Day, some lower
court authority existed to support the maintenance of an action for wages
4

The dissenters also regarded the disparity in availability of judicial review as
violative of fifth amendment due process insofar as that safeguard embodies in the
concept of equal protection under law.
5For a detailed discussion of the Board, its composition, history, procedure, and
effectiveness, see Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique
Administrative Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567 (1937); Attorney General's Comm., Administrative Procedures in Governmental Agencies, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1941).
6 Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (1) (1958).
7 Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1958).
8 Reynolds v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 174 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Futhey v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 96 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Il. 1951); Hecox v. Pullman Co.,
85 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Wash. 1949).
9 Majors v. Thompson, 235 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1956); Michel v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 188 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 862 (1951); Greenwood v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 129 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Kelly v. Nashville C.
& St. L. Ry., 75 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Tenn. 1948); cf. Ramsey v. Chesapeake &
O.R.R., 75 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1948); Berryman v. Pullman Co., 48 F. Supp.
542 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
10 Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Central of Ga. Ry., 199
F.2d 384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 908 (1952) (question of whether enforcement of seniority rules established by collective bargaining agreement between carrier
and co-defendant brotherhood resulted in change in regulations and working conditions
allegedly established by collective bargaining agreement among carrier, co-defendant
brotherhood and plaintiff brotherhood held within primary jurisdiction of Board);
Thompson v. St Louis-San Francisco Ry., 113 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Ala. 1953) (claim
of employee seeldng coordination allowance under Washington Job Agreement held
within primary jurisdiction of Board) ; cf. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S.
239 (1950). Compare Howard v. Thompson, 72 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Mo. 1947),
rev'd sub nora. Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 191 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1951),
aff'd sub nor. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
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due in a breach-of-contract-case,"1 a money remedy also within the repertory of the Board. These last decisions had purported to rely upon a line
of Supreme Court cases authorizing judicial action for damages for wrongful discharge-a mode of relief not within the Board's competence-as an
optional alternative to the Board-administered remedy of reinstatement with
restoration of seniority and back pay.' 2 In sharp distinction, then, to the
express statutory power of the railroads under section 3 First (p) to secure
a trial de novo in the district courts of Board awards against them, judicial
review in favor of employees seems to have been entirely curtailed, except
in instances of alleged unconstitutionality of the Board's determination
procedures. 13 Presumably also an employee could secure review for alleged
insufficiency of any Board money award greater than zero dollars under the
explicit "money award" clause of section 3 First (m). But as regards
a claimant in Day's posture who, forced to seek relief before the Board, had
his claim wholly rejected, the Court's broad language in Price that "it
would distort the English language to interpret that term [money award]
as including a refusal to award a money payment," 14 could conceivably
close all possible access to the courts and pose a critical statutory and constitutional issue of denial of jury trial.
The precise limits which the fifth and seventh amendments and the
separation-of-powers concept put upon the ability of Congress to replace
traditional article III, jury-trial causes of action by agency-administered
procedures not subjected to judicial review, have been only suggested, not
squarely posed, by the cases. 15 The venerable Crowell v. Benso,, 16 nar11 Cepero v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 195 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 840 (1952); Beeler v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 169 F.2d 557 (10th Cir. 1948)
(dictum), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 903 (1949); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 83
F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
121n Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941), the Court held that
since the Board was powerless to award damages for wrongful discharge, the employee seeking such damages initially in the courts was entitled to a judicial determnation thereof providing the other elements of federal jurisdiction are present, i.e.,
diversity and jurisdictional amount. See also Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc. v.
Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953); Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 244
(1950) (dictum).
13Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945) (union before Board not
authorized to bind absent employees) ; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Templeton,
181 F.2d 527 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950) (failure to give notice) ;
Edwards v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 176 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
885 (1949) (conflict of interest between Board members and employee).
14 360 U.S. at 608.
15 See, e.g.,

HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND

THE FEDERAL Sys-

-m 325-40 (1953). The question of congressional power to substitute administrafive for jury trial proceedings in vindication of a plaintiff's not-yet arisen civil claim
should be distinguished from problems which arise when Congress closes the courts
to civil plaintiffs with a so-called vested right; compare the discussion of the Portal-toPortal Incident discussed id. at 300-02. Entirely different issues are presented than those
which arise in connection with legislative attempts to enforce the criminal law through
non-article III, nonjury tribunals (McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo,
361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960)), or to withdraw elements of liability
from the inquiry of the article III enforcing court, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414 (1944).
16285 U.S. 22 (1932).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

738

[Vol.108

rowly sustaining the grant of conclusiveness to administrative findings of
"non-jurisdictional" fact, involved questions of responsibility within the
admiralty jurisdiction and hence outside the ambit of seventh-amendment
pressures, yet even in that realm Justice Hughes found restrictions on the
legislative power to by-pass "constitutional courts." 17 Admittedly that
case involved a challenge by the employer against whom a judicially
enforceable liability was attached through agency proceedings, not by the
"protected" or "benefited" employee, and it has been argued by the most
18
that a distinction ought to be made
distinguished scholars in the field
between the situations of the two, in that (1) constitutional intervention
in favor of the employee demands a more affirmative incursion by the
judicial branch upon the powers of the other departments than does the
mere refusal-to-be-employed-for-unconstitutional-ends which is the core of
the case of the employer's challenge-the minimally necessary ground of
9
judicial autonomy and the basis of Marbury v. MadisonI -and (2) "the
protected groups in an administrative program pay for their protection
. . .[in that the] agency becomes their champion and they stand or fall
by it." 2 0 These last considerations should be invoked, certainly, along
with the utterly alien nature of the claim to any known at common law, to
2
explain Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 1 which refused
to find jurisdiction in the courts to hear a rival union's challenge to the
Board's certification of a collective bargaining representative. And it was
not only the unlikeness to common law of the complex of rights and duties
22
involved in Rowlette v. Rothstein Dental Labs., Inc., which led the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia to sustain Congress' right to substitute for common-law tort the workman's compensation program there
in issue, but also the very nature of that program; for the court stressed that
it was of the essence of the liability-regardless-of-fault theory of compensation that it "leaves nothing to be tried by jury." 23 But the position of
the Day-class claimant is very different from any of these. His claim is
not in accord with a special constellation of jural relationships substituted
24
but is directly upon
legislatively for older principles of liability,
37 Id.at 50.
18 HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 319-22, 325-27; Jaffe, The Individual Right To Initiate Administrative Process, 25 IowA L. REv. 485 (1940).
19 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2

0 HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 326.

21320 U.S. 297 (1943).
22 63 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1933).
23
Id.at 152.
2
4The Adjustment Board sits exclusively to interpret contracts, and the whole
base of an employee's claim before it is the binding obligation of contract. See Garrison, supra note 5. The Board is to be distinguished from the NLRB, before whom
the individual employee's claim must be presented in the form of a ULP complaint,
in that by proceedings before the latter agency the employee loses none of his commonlaw forms of action against the employer.
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contract. 25 The NRAB is not his "protector," but a body whose fifty-fifty
representative membership is designed precisely to assure its impartiality.
Disputed questions of fact and of contract interpretation remain to be resolved in the disposition of his claim. And for the judiciary to hear that
claim is not to take on a roving commission to enforce the Constitution upon
the legislative and executive arms, inasmuch as Day's case is properly presented to the federal district court in diversity as to a state court of general
common-law jurisdiction, which has the obligation to enforce the claim in the
absence of some affirmative impediment by controlling congressional act.
This is not to indicate that the Court would or should hold Congress
powerless to make the administrative channel of relief for claimants in
Day's situation both exclusive and nonreviewable. The intricate nexus of
ongoing employment relationships which the Railway Labor Act is intended
to foster and insulate is too complex, and the relationship of a commonlaw-like money claim to various other components of any given grievance
situation is too variable, to permit any pat formula drawn from the seventh
amendment to inhibit Congress from drawing lines which are rather
practicable than precise in this area of regulation. What this perspective
does indicate, however, is that there are more considerations operative in
interpretation of the act than are adequately handled by the majority
opinions in Day and, especially, in Price. Congress, in authorizing by
section 3 First (in) judicial review of Board determinations "insofar as
they shall contain a money award," did intend to draw one discernible line.
It is difficult to contend that that provision was intended to allow appeal
to the courts only by the railroads against whom a money award was
ordered, since the independent provisions of section 3 First (p) permit
the carriers to secure review of any NRAB order by precipitating an
enforcement suit (within two years) through noncompliance. 26 It is far
more reasonable that the "money award" clause was intended to make
25 The collective bargaining agreement "is only an agreement as to the terms
on which contracts of employment may be satisfactorily made and carried out. It
is a mutual general offer to be closed by specific acceptances. When negotiated by
representatives of an organization it is called collective bargaining, but ordinarily
the laws of the organization, . . . do not require the individual members to serve
under it, but only that if they serve they will do so under its terms. . . . When the
agreement is published by the managers, it becomes . . . the rule of that industry."
Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Webb, 64 F.2d 902, 903 (5th Cir. 1933). Under this interpretation of the legal effect of a collective bargaining agreement, the agreement
itself is not a contract but its terms become incorporated into every contract of
employment between members of the labor organization and the employer at the
time the employee accepts the general offer of terms of employment by accepting the
employment Under the alternative construction of such agreements-that the agreement is a valid contract between the union and the employer-the individual employee
should be able to enforce it as a third party beneficiary. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 379A (rev. ed. 1936).
26 The railroad employees do possess another effective means of implementing
Board awards-the strike threat-which may make resort to enforcement proceedings
under § 3 First (p) unnecessary in many cases. Nevertheless, it is true that the trial
de novo provided in that section allows a railroad employer resort to the courts in
every case in which he demands it precedent to the imposition upon him of an immediately enforceable-i.e., "liquidated"-like---obligation.
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review available to at least some employee claimants; and to draw the line
for these purposes between those who receive an award of one dollar and
those who receive an award of no dollars is not only to make a discrimination without any conceivable reason in functional fact, but to cut dangerously close to constitutional thin ice in a large class of cases. No light is
shed on the question by the legislative history which, while it does show an
intent to make conclusive adverse NRAB determinations of employees'
claims, 2 7 does not reveal the scope of intended exception or demonstrate
awareness of the jury-trial problem in wage-claim cases.
Perhaps the crux of the difficulty is that the reviewability of an award
is not a concept of invariant meaning in all cases. Fundamentally there
remains the question as to what is to be reviewed, merely the amount of
liability or the fact of liability itself? It would seem that the choice between
these alternatives might reasonably depend, in turn, upon the relationship
of the money claim to all of the other elements actually involved in the
particular NRAB dispute: a case in which a claim for wage differentials
is only incident to a contest whose primary focus is the establishment of
job classifications or the determination of whether a given task falls within
or without a particular contract term-a question of importance for the
present and future continuously operating processes of the labor-management relation-might well be treated differently from a case like Day
where the sole issue between the employee, now retired, and the railroad,
is a past-due money liability. This difference seemed to be recognized in
principle by the line of Supreme Court cases which, beginning with Moore
v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,28 allowed a discharged employee to treat his employment relationship as definitively terminated and sue for damages for wrongful discharge at common law or to seek to recapture his employee status,
with all its ongoing contractual obligations, by proceeding before the Board.
The identical approach of alternative primary jurisdictions is foreclosed for
the Day-type case by the Day holding itself and probably properly so: to
force all claimants before the Board insofar as that agency is capable of
supplying the remedy they seek seems a more economical procedure, and
one calculated to keep most railway labor litigation before the expert body
established to handle it. But the principle which Moore applied to the
primary jurisdiction question could well be applied to appeals of all Board
cases under section 3 First (m), and would seem to provide a workable
tool for bringing into play the different treatment appropriate for different
types of cases. This approach would involve reading the "money-award"
clause as referring to a class of dispute typified by claim, not by outcomeevery case in which monetary recovery is sought, and whether or not
granted. But such cases would be reviewable only to the extent provided
27

Hearings on S. 3266 Before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 33, 35 (1934); Hearings on H.R. 7650 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 58-65 (1934).
28312 U.S. 630 (1941).
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in section 3 First (m): "insofar" as they contain such an award. This
means that in the case where the money claim is joined with, as appurtenant
to, a request for a Board interpretive ruling which will govern the continuing operations of the labor management establishment, the interpretation-though not the money award-will become "final and binding" upon
both parties before the appeal, and thus by working a collateral estoppel on
the issue of contractual obligation and liability, leave only the amount of
damages for relitigation. An employee who has a case like Day's-who
severs himself or finds himself severed from the active railroad labor force
and seeks to recover solely a sum of past wages due--could, on the other
band, put in issue before the Board only the money claim and, since the
carrier's monetary liability is the sole question determined by the NRAB,
all component elements of that question would remain open for redetermination on appeal. The special situation of the employee who attempts
to switch the nature of his claim between agency and court-the Price case,
in effect-could and would necessarily be handled on straight election-ofremedies principles, a ground which is sufficient to support the holding in
Price,which finds explicit recognition in at least some significant language
of the opinion, 29 and which has been made the explicit ground of several
80
earlier lower federal rulings on all fours with Prie.
Such a resolution
would be in accord with what the court actually decided in Moore, Day, and
Price, would conform to the language and to the apparent institutional
scheme of section 3 First (m) and section 3 First (p) of the act, and while
leaving to the NRAB the vast bulk of routine, continuingly critical controversy over the interpretation of railroad-labor collective bargaining
agreements, would accord full-scale review of the agency's decisions in
those cases in which, because of special circumstances or at the employee's
election, the employment relationship is terminated and leaves solely a
common-law-like money claim for litigation.
29 See 360 U.S. at 607 n.6; and see especially the Court's distinction of Moore, id.
at 609 n.8.
8O E.g., Michel v. Lousiville & N.R.R., 188 F.2d 224, 225-226 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 862 (1951) : "The primary question in the case is whether the voluntary submission of the employee's claim to the Division of the Railroad Adjustment
Board . . . the prosecution of which was had with the full approval of the employee,
and the determination of the claim upon the merits and adverse to the employee's
contentions, presented a bar to a subsequent suit upon the same employment contract
between the claimant against the carrier in a suit at law for damages .

.

.

. [T]he

proceeding before the . . . Board evidenced an election of inconsistent remedies in
that it was an acceptance of one of the two means afforded by law for redress for
any grievances or claim arising out of the alleged unjustified discharge of the then
claimant. . . . There is . . . no requirement that an employee so prosecute his

claim for relief for breach of an employment agreement before the Adjustment Board.
He may proceed in the first instance by suit in the Courts to recover damages for
breach of the contract. . . . [W]hen there is a voluntary election to proceed in the
manner provided by the Railway Labor Act . . . and the claim pursued to a determination of the merits . . . this procedure by both right and reason represents an
election of remedies which bars the independent suit which was otherwise available
to the claimant."

742

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVAIA LAW REVIEW

CONFLICT OF LAWS-DUTY

[Vol.108

OF DIRECTOR OF FOEIGN COR-

PORATIONq TO SHAREHOLDER HELD GOVERNED BY LAW OF ForUM
WHEN CORPORATE ACTIVITY CENTERS IN FORUM

Knowing that defendant corporation's per share liquidation value had

mushroomed to five times the book value of its stock, corporate officers
(also directors and owners or controllers by family ties of the majority
stock interest) by representing to the minority shareholders that a projected
development program would drastically curtail dividends and that no plans
for liquidation were in the offing, induced those shareholders to sell all
their stock to the corporation at approximately book value. The representations and negotiations took place in Louisiana where the officers and
all but a few of the stockholders were resident; defendant itself was a
Delaware corporation which conducted most of its business, had most of
its assets and maintained its principal offices in Louisiana. In an action
by the ex-minority holders for rescission and accounting, the federal district court sitting in Louisiana found for plaintiffs and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, 1 applying Louisiana law to impose upon the officer-directors a
fiduciary duty of full disclosure in dealings with shareholders. 2 Denying
a petition for rehearing, the same court reaffirmed the application of
Louisiana law,3 reasoning that all "contact points" were in the forum
1 Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1959),
affirming 159 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. La. 1958). The disposition of defendant's motion
to dismiss and the granting of a preliminary injunction to prevent distribution of the
corporation's remaining assets is reported in Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber
Co., 143 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. La. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1957). It is
interesting to note that the district judge in his opinion on the preliminary injunction
said: "Defendant is a Delaware corporation. As such, it, its stockholders, and persons
claiming against it are subject to the corporation laws of that state." 143 F. Supp.
at 836.
2As recognized in the instant case, Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson,
268 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1959), Delaware does not impose a fiduciary duty upon
directors or majority shareholders in buying stock from minority shareholders. Cahall
v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 Atl. 224 (Ch. 1921), aff'd, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 118 Ati.
1 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (affirmed on the grounds of a fiduciary duty to the corporation)
citing with approval from DuPont v. DuPont, 242 Fed. 98, 136 (D. Del. 1917)
(dictum). See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 40 (3d Cir. 1947).
3 Since there were discoverable no Louisiana cases to which the federal court could
look, under the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)
(see Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahagony Ass'n, 129 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1941), reversal
upheld on rehearing, 129 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1942)), the court of appeals adopted the
rule it believed that the state court would with greatest likelihood adopt. (For this
it looked to "the general law," inasmuch as in its view Louisiana tended to follow
ordinary conflicts principles.) See Steckler v. Pennroad Corp., 136 F.2d 197 (3d cir.
1943). Compare Polk County, Ga. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 486, 489
(5th Cir. 1959), with Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir.
1945). See generally 11 ARK. L. REv. 456 (1957). For a discussion of the effect
of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in the area of internal affairs see
Note, The Development of the "Internal Affairs" Rule in the Federal Courts and
Its Future Under Erie v. Tompkins, 46 COLUM. L. Rlv. 413 (1946). See Williams
v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946). See generally Lewald v. York Corp.,
68 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Note, 33 COLUm. L. REv. 492 (1933). Compare
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) ; Kelley v. American Sugar Ref.
Co., 139 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1943).
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state.4 Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
Traditionally, if a case is characterized as one which deals with the
internal affairs of a corporation, the law of the state of its incorporation
controls.5 The older rule was that when such cases involved foreign
6
corporations, the forum would decline to exercise judicial jurisdiction,
7
but this view has been in large part abandoned, and the "internal affairs"
rubric has become a touchstone of significance for pure choice-of-law
problems." As defining the scope of the concept, the rule of North State
Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field,9 which differentiates between acts
by directors or agents of the corporation which affect the stockholder "in
his capacity as a member of the corporation," 10 (internal affairs), and those

which merely affect him in his individual capacity" 1 has been generally
accepted. Thus, a plaintiff's claim has been held to concern internal affairs
when the suit was an action to compel restoration of a former stockholder to
that status after forfeiture of stock by the foreign corporation,12 to compel
specific performance of a wholly executory contract to issue the large
4 Alternative holding. The court also found actionable fraud under the Louisiana
Civil Code.
5Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1933); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 40 (3d Cir. 1947).

6E.g., Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253, 258 (1883).

See 17

FLETCHER, PRIVATE

CoI'ORATrors §§ 8425-45 (rev. & perm. ed. 1933) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER];
2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 192-200 (1935). A sharply critical view is taken in
Note, 29 CoLum. L. REv. 968 (1929).
7 See

Note, Forum Non Conveniens as a Substitute for the Internal Affairs Rule,

58 COLUm. L. REV. 234 (1958). Courts today will tend to exercise jurisdiction unless
dissuaded by the presence in a controversy of such functional impediments as (1) the
possible unenforceability of a decree, including considerations of the location out of
the jurisdiction of a corporation's books, directors or property (see, e.g., State ex rel.
Watkins v. North Am. Land & Timber Co., 106 La. 621, 31 So. 172 (1902) (jurisdiction denied) ; Sauerbrunn v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 N.Y. 363, 115 N.E. 1001
(1917) (jurisdiction denied) ; contra, Guilford v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 Minn.
332, 61 N.W. 324 (1894) (jurisdiction taken)) ; (2) the possibility that a decree may
violate the public policy of the state of incorporation (see, e.g., Thompson v. Southern
Connellsville Coke Co., 269 Pa. 500, 112 Atl. 533 (1921) (jurisdiction denied));
(3) the problems involved in construing of another jurisdiction's statutes (see, e.g.,
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) (jurisdiction denied)) ; (4) the
possibility of harm to the corporation from inconsistent decrees in various states
(see, e.g., Olsen v. Danish Bhd., 150 Minn. 8, 184 N.W. 178 (1921) (jurisdiction
denied) ; Sauerbrunn v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. supra (jurisdiction denied); Note,
29 CoLum. L. REv. 968 (1929)). Of course, in virtually all of the "internal affairs"
cases some of these elements of practical difficulty were present, singly or in combination, and stood as the functional basis for the refusal-of-jurisdiction doctrine. See,
e.g., Thompson v. Southern Connellsville Coke Co., supra (jurisdiction denied);
Kansas & E.R.R. Constr. Co. v. Topeka, Salina & W.R.R., 135 Mass. 34 (1883)
(jurisdiction denied). The distinction in approach is often one of emphasis.
8 See, e.g., Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 629 & n.7 (D. Del.
1943).
9 64 Md. 151, 20 Atl. 1039 (1885).
10 Id. at 154, 20 Atl. at 1040.
". For example, a tort committed by an employee of the corporation.
12 North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 20 AtI. 1039
(1885) (jurisdiction denied). Accord, Smith v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 96 Mass. (14
Allen) 336, 343 (1867) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 192.10 (1935).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

744

[Vol.108

majority of a foreign railroad corporation's stock to a foreign construction
company in consideration of laying the road, 13 to determine the legitimate
stock owners as between two factions each claiming to hold virtually all of
the shares of a foreign corporation, 14 to appoint a receiver to take charge
of and distribute the assets of a foreign corporation on the complaint of a
stockholder who claimed mismanagement, 15 and to intervene in the manage17
the
ment of the foreign corporation. 16 As the court itself recognizes,
instant case falls well within the principle: the theory of plaintiffs' recovery
is not restitution for fraud,' 3 but redress for breach of a duty predicated
9
upon the intra-associate relationship of officer-director and shareholder 1 a question of policy formulation in the legal control of the corporate institution as an institution. 20 But in electing domestic law the court expressly rejects analysis in terms of internal affairs, regarding the internalaffairs syntax as "either inapplicable or unsound where the only contact
point with the incorporating state is the naked fact of incorporation, and

13 Kansas & E.R.R. Constr. Co. v. Topeka, Salina & W.R.R., 135 Mass. 34, 40

(jurisdiction denied). See generally 17 FLETCHER §§ 8425-45.
Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253, 258 (1883) (jurisdiction denied).
1 E.g., Maccarone v. Big Sign Shop, Inc., 41 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (jurisdiction denied); Sidway v. Missouri Land & Live-Stock Co., 101 Fed. 481, 483 (S.D.
Mo. 1900) (jurisdiction denied). See generally 17 FLETCHER §§ 8441, 8554.
16
E.g., Thompson v. Southern Connellsville Coke Co., 269 Pa. 500, 112 Atl. 533
(1921) (jurisdiction denied) ; McCloskey v. Snowden, 212 Pa. 249, 61 At. 796 (1905)
(jurisdiction denied).
17 Instant case at 320-21.
18 Except as an alternative ground. See note 4 supra. In an action for rescission
premised on fraud, or on any element in the contractual relation which assumes legal
significance because of the law's concern with the single transaction itself rather than
with the relationships of the parties within some wider context which is itself the object
of a pattern of judicial control or policy, the lex loci contracti would govern. E.g.,
Fox v. Corry, 149 La. 445, 452, 89 So. 410, 412 (1921); American Realty Co. v.
Eastern Tire & Rubber Co., 274 Mass. 297, 174 N.E. 486 (1931) ; Larx Co. v. Nicol,
224 Minn. 1, 28 N.W.2d 705 (1946) ; United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Ruggles,
258 N.Y. 32, 38, 179 N.E. 250, 251 (1932) ; R STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 332,
334 (1934). But cf. Von Tresckow v. Von Tresckow, 15 Misc. 2d 1090, 181 N.Y.S.2d
406 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (intent of parties governs).
19 The substance of the internal affairs tag is the isolation of a class of case
wherein the primary focus is upon the responsibilities of the members of a corporation
inter sese. See Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 553 (1946) (dictum) ;
Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 629 & n.7 (D. Del. 1943). Accord,
Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the
Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLU-,. L. REv. 1118, 1124-27 (1958).
20 The issue of policy has been differently resolved in the several jurisdictions.
The majority rule imposes no fiduciary duty of full disclosure upon corporate officers,
directors, or majority stockholders who purchase shares of the corporation's stock
from minority stockholders. See, e.g., Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 174, 188 N.W.
266, 268 (1922); 3 FLETCHER § 1168.1. The so-called minority rule imposes a strict
fiduciary duty of full disclosure. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232
(1903) (this was the first case to apply the minority rule); 3 FLETCHER § 1168.2.
In recent years a third view known as the "special facts" doctrine has been increasingly
used. This view imposes a fiduciary duty where circumstances warrant the imposition
of such a duty. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909). Compare the approach
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 16, 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)
(1958).
(1883)
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1
where all other contact points . . . are found in another jurisdiction." 2
The holding appears susceptible of interpretation under either of two
rationales: (1) as extending to corporate affairs the recently developing
contact-grouping approach to choice of law, 22 or (2) as following an older
and perhaps better established line of authority 23 (although probably a
minority view) 2 which has applied the law of the forum in cases of the
internal-affairs type in which a foreign corporation had all of its assets and
transacted all of its business in the forum state and in which virtually all of
the corporate shareholders were domestic residents--cases grounded on the
theory that the corporation was foreign in name only.25 Although neither

the authority cited by the instant court

ratio decidendi
21

7

2

26

nor its own articulation of the

is illuminating, the decision on its facts seems more ap-

Instant case at 321. The court also argues that neither the statutory laws of
the state of incorporation nor the corporate charter has bearing for determination of
the case at issue. Ibid. (Although perhaps the same statement can be read merely
as conclusory--a declaration that the court will not apply those sources, or would
not, even if applicable. In view of the court's citation in footnote at an immediately
preceding passage, it may be that reference is here intended to the generally accepted
rule that in determining what powers a corporation may exercise in the forum state
neither the general legislation nor judicial decisions of the state of incorporation are
given extraterritorial effect. See generally 17 FLETCER -§§ 8318-29. As the doctrine
has been developed in the context of situations involving dealings between the corporation as an operative entity and outside parties, it is inappropriate here.)
22
Long urged by the scholars, the grouping-of-contacts or center-of-gravity
approach has of late met increasing judicial approval, see e.g., W. H. Barber Co. v.
Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 586, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1945) ; Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155,
124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), although no case has applied the method to corporate transactions like those in the instant case.
2
3Wait v. Kern River Mining, Milling, & Developing Co., 157 Cal. 16, 106 Pac.
98 (1909) ; State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949) (forum state had applicable statute; public utility
involved); Scholl v. Allen, 237 Ky. 716, 36 S.W.2d 353 (1931).
24 Compare Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations,65 YALE LJ. 137 (1955), with
Reese & Kaufman, supra note 19, at 1125-26. Applying law of foreign state of incorporation despite presence of all corporate records, assets, business in forum state, see, e.g.,
Sprague v. Universal Voting Mach. Co., 134 Ill. App. 379 (1907); Thompson v.
Southern Connellsville Coke Co., 269 Pa. 500, 112 AtL. 533 (1921).
25 One of the determinative elements in such cases appears to be the fear of
encouraging foreign incorporation solely to avoid unfavorable local law. See Latty,
supra note 24, at 142-43.
26
The court cited Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952), in which a
former stockholder of a dissolved Illinois corporation sued the former president of the
corporation for the alleged fraudulent conversion (before dissolution) of the plaintiff's
stock. A federal court sitting in Kansas applied Kansas law to impose a fiduciary
capacity upon defendant even though a substantial part of the transaction had taken
place in Illinois. However, in that case there was actual fraud upon which relief
could be based, and at no point in its opinion did the court indicate that it recognized
that a conflict-of-laws problem was involved. The court in the instant case also relied
upon Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
193 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1951), which admitted that the general rule required application of the law of the state of incorporation, but held that, since the case was a second
appeal, the court would decline to reconsider. Id. at 669. Furthermore, that court
said that the law of the forum would not require a different result. Ibid.
27 It is unclear whether the court intends to stress that all contact points "are
found in another jurisdiction" than that of incorporation, instant case at 321, or that
"all contact points are in the forum," ibid. (Original emphasis.) The court uses the
phrases interchangeably without seeming to notice that they embody different concepts
and might support different theories.
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propriately assimilable to the former (center of gravity) than to the latter
(domestic-in-all-but-name) authorities. The corporation involved had
substantial assets in Arkansas and Texas, did business in those states, and
28
had shareholders (plaintiffs here) who were Arkansas residents.
In deviating from the objectivity, clarity and invariability of the stateof-incorporation rule for controversies involving the obligations among
themselves of the several groups within the corporate institution, the court
has created a risk that corporations doing interstate business will be subjected to the burden of functioning under a multiplicity of legal commands.
The burden is heaviest where, as in the instant case, the law-making agencies
of the various jurisdictions can reasonably, and do in fact, cast differing
judgments as to the appropriate legal duties attaching as among the members of the association ;29 and the risk inheres inevitably in the indeterminacy of the concept: "contact point." Even in the instant case, an
extraordinarily strong one for successful uniform application of the centerof-gravity approach, it is less than certain that an Arkansas court 30 main-

taining this same claim against this Delaware corporation, would have felt
unerringly compelled to look to Louisiana law. Choice-of-law decisions,
inevitably presented to a court in biasing conjunction with the merits, are
particularly susceptible to pressure, conscious or unconscious, in the absence
of a fixed point of reference. "Contact points" are less than fixed.31
Moreover, to the extent of whatever reality they do possess, "contact
points" may often be relatively equally distributed among two or more
jurisdictions, leaving choice of law to the vagaries of a "weighing." Or
those realities themselves may shift in time, causing the internal relationships of a corporation to alter as its assets in one state undergo a proportionate increase.3 2 The contact-grouping method will often permit each
tribunal to apply its own law without having to face up too closely to
what it is doing. The result, by indirection, might well be that which has
been espoused by Professor Currie, 33 who contends that the law of the
forum should be applied in all cases other than those in which "the forum
state has no interest in the application of its policy, but . . . the foreign
28 For extensive narrative of the facts, consult the opinion of the district court,
Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 159 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. La. 1958).
29 See note 20 supra.
80 Arkansas is a possible forum state, because assets of the corporation are located
there. A few minority shareholders were residents of that state. See also note 32
infra.
31 This is not to imply that "internal affairs" is a concept of unmistakable referrent. But it seems less wholly fluid than the "contact points" balance.
3
2 In the instant case, the corporation had its principal offices and conducted most
of its business in Arkansas during the early 1900's. 159 F. Supp. at 108.
33 Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE
L.J. 171; Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. Rav. 9 (1958). See also Currie, Married
Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHi. L. REv. 227
(1958); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation In the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. Rlv. 205 (1958) ; Currie, The Constitution and the
"Transitory" Cause of Action (pts. 1-2), 73 HARv. L. Ra,. 36, 268 (1959).
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state has" such an interest.34 Such a result necessarily abandons that goal
of conflicts law which seeks to prevent "forum shopping" by giving uniform
treatment to a given fact situation no matter where suit is brought.
Of major significance also are the expectations of the parties. 35 The
instant case is perhaps the most difficult one in which to convince a court
of justified reliance, 36 and (involving as it does a situation in which interests
of stockholders have been terminated and those holders seek rescission only
to share in the profits of an entity which is itself being liquidated) the case
certainly presents an extremely poor instance for an argument which
focuses on the disruption of on-going intracorporate relationships. Yet it
is true that persons selecting a state in which to incorporate do make their
choice on the basis of a complex of considerations which includes relative
permissible powers of directors, liabilities of directors and officers and
rights of shareholders under a multiplicity of circumstances.3 7 Incorporators frequently choose a state precisely for the directorial latitude it
allows, and to subject their corporate programming to the unsettling effects
of divers other institutional obligations seems a hindrance without compensating benefits. For unlike the thorough stranger who in his business
transactions with foreign corporations in his state should be able to expect
the corporation to exercise no power toward him inconsistent with local
public policy or not granted to others incorporated in the state, a shareholder, as a voluntary part owner of the corporation, may reasonably be
required to assume the risk of those incidents of corporate powers and
duties given by the incorporating state which, as a whole, facilitate the corporate activities from which he seeks to benefit.3 8 And although in fact
he may seldom protect himself by legal inquiry, he has the power to do so.
In sum, the choice-of-law holding of the instant case, even were it justifiable
on its particular facts, seems to have little growing power as authority for
a sound conflicts rule.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ORnDiN~xop FORBIDDING DISsEmI nATIow oF CRImE ComIc BOOKS TO CHIDRwF
HELD VOLATIVE OF
FREE PREss LIBERTIEs INHERENT IN FOURTEENTHr AMENDMNT

Appellant, a dealer in magazines and other printed material, brought
an action for a declaratory judgment as to the constitutional validity of a
34

1959

DUKE L.J. at

178.

35
36 See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 19, at 1127.

The finding of fraud, see note 4 mpra, is not without significance.

37 See generally ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESs ENTERPRISES 159-65 (1949) ; Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations,13 HARv.

L. REv. 198 (1899); Shiels, Why Do Wisconsin Concerns Incorporate in Other
States?, 11 Wis. L. REv. 457 (1936).
38 In the instant case, the defendant corporation bad been incorporated in Louisiana
prior to 1940, but dissolved in order to obtain the benefit of the Delaware corporation
laws. In its petition for certiorari defendant argues that, having chosen Delaware
law, the shareholders of this closely held corporation should be bound by it.
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county ordinance 1 which, reciting the legislatively determined imminent
danger that children under the age of eighteen would be incited to committing or attempting to commit crimes or that a preference would be created
in their minds to participate in crime, made the distribution of crime comic
books to children a criminal offense. "Crime comic books" were defined
as any pamphlet in which an account of a crime-specified to include the
commission or attempt to commit certain named offenses 2 -was set forth
by means of a series of five or more pictures in sequence, accompanied by
narrative writing or words represented as being spoken by a pictured character. The ordinance specifically excluded accounts of crime which appeared in a newspaper of general circulation, which delineated actual historical events, or which described occurrences actually set forth in the
sacred scriptures of any religion. The California Supreme Court held the
ordinance unconstitutional on the grounds (1) that it violated the concepts
of freedom of the press inherent in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment (since there was no showing of clear and present danger of a
substantial evil which would justify suppression), (2) that it was too broad
(including publications having no relation to juvenile delinquency), (3) that
the exemptions created were arbitrary, unreasonable and denied appellant
equal protection of the law,3 and (4) that it failed to establish a clearly
defined standard of guilt.4 Katzev v. County of Los Angeles, 341 P.2d 310

(Cal. 1959).
The court's ruling that the language of this penal ordinance was too
broad would appear to be well taken: certainly many humorous-type comic
books (which the legislature in its declaration of evils sought to be remedied
had particularly distinguished from the detrimental type) r could be included under its express terms, 6 although the defect might perhaps be cor1 Los Angeles County, Cal., Ordinance 6633, Feb. 15, 1955.

2 The forbidden crimes included arson, burglary, kidnapping, mayhem, murder,
rape, robbery, theft, trainwrecking, voluntary manslaughter, or assault with a deadly
weapon or caustic chemical; and "commission" was so defined as to include not only
acts by humans but also acts by animals or any nonhuman, part-human, or imaginary
being which, if done by a human would constitute any of the named offenses. Los
Angeles County, Cal., Ordinance 6633 § 4(c), Feb. 15, 1955.
3 Appellant argued that crime comic strips in newspapers were as detrimental
as any other type of comic and that a specific exemption for newspapers was arbitrary and unreasonable.
4 The objection of broadness and that of lack of a clearly defined standard of
guilt are only two facets of the more general problem of vagueness, but the court
separately treated the two concepts. See Note, 62 HARv. L. IEv. 77 (1948) ; Comment, 53 Mica. L. REv. 264 (1954).
5 "There is a great volume . . . of crime 'comic' books available to children.
. . . These crime 'comic' books resemble closely other publications devoted in sub-

stance to humor . . . , are placed for sale side by side with humorous publications ....
There is a clear and present danger . . . that the continued . . . cir-

culation . . . of crime comic' books to children will incite said children to commit
crimes." Los Angeles County, Cal., Ordinance 6633 § 1, Feb. 15, 1955.
6 For example, a comic book depicting Bugs Bunny stealing carrots in one short
scene, or Elmer Fudd setting a spring gun in his garden would be included in the
forbidden publications as there is no requirement of brutality, sadism, or horror,
but only that "an account of a crime is set forth by means of a series of five (5) or
more drawings . . . in sequence." Los Angeles County, Cal., Ordinance 6633
§4(a), Feb. 15, 1955.
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rected by judicial construction. 7 The court's objection to the statute as
constituting a denial of equal protection also seems valid since, for example,
protection of a historical delineation in comic form and in vivid detail of
the St. Valentine's Day massacre when fictional accounts of FBI operations would be forbidden 8 has no ascertainable basis in reason. Similar
support can be found for the court's holding that the statute failed to establish a clearly defined standard of guilt.9 But regardless of the fact that the
instant court's decision can probably be supported on at least one of the
enumerated grounds, there exists substantial, though controverted, authority to support the theory that detrimental and delinquent-producing effects
are caused by crime comic books.10 Thus it would seem that a legislative
determination that regulation of such books is warranted because of possible adverse psychological effects should be constitutionally supportable."
Although freedom of speech and press as protected from state infringement by the fourteenth amendment'12 not only guarantees freedom from
censorship prior to publication'13 but also prevents subsequent reprisals
for the exercise of these rights,' 4 the guarantees are not absolute and unlimited '5 but may be subjected under state police powers to such restricT

For an extreme example of the Court construing a statute narrowly to uphold

its constitutionality, see United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
8

See instant case at 316.

9 Compare instant case at 317-18, with Katzev v. County of Los Angeles,
336 P.2d 6, 24-25 (Cal. Ct App. 1959).
1
0WERTHAM, SmucTION OF THE INNOCENT 164 (1954); Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, Comic Books and Juvenile Delinquency, S. REP. No. 62, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 32 (1955) (Kefauver committee); New York State Joint Legislative
Comm., The Publication and Dissemination of Offensive and Obscene Material,
LEG. Doc. No. 83 (1957); New York State Joint Legislative Comm., The Publication and Dissemination of Objectionable and Obscene Materials, LEG. Doc. No. 32
(1956); New York State Joint Legislative Comm., The Publication of Comics,
LEG. Doc. No. 37 (1955); New York State joint Legislative Comm., The Publication of Comics, LEG. Doc. No. 37, at 11-16 (1954); Resolution on Comics, 5 JUvENHIE
COURT JUDGES J. 4 (1954).
For specific instances see Note, Crime Comics and the
Constitution, 7 STAN. L. REv. 237, 251 (1955). See generally id. at 249-50. But see
Thrasher, The Comics and Delinquency: Cause or Scapegoat?, 23 3. OF EDUC.
SocioLOGy 195 (1949).

"3 For an argument that legislative action in the area is not yet warranted, see
the concurring opinion of Judge Frank in Roth v. United States, 237 F.2d 796,
It could be argued that proper
801, 816 (1956), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
parental supervision is a sufficient remedy, but the ready availability to children
of such publications makes normal parental supervision largely ineffectual.
12

E.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 239 (1936); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,

368 (1931).
'3 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1952) ; Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14
(1931). But see Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
'4

Thoruhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).

Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S.
584, 593 (1942) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) ; Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
'5
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forbids
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will
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regulation,
the
absent
that,
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and
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can
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the
which
interest
some
of
abuse
immediate
occur a grave and
8
susboth
been
have
claims
amendment
first
However,
lawfully protect.'
tained '9 and denied 20 without resort to the rule, and finally in Dennis v.
United States,21 the Supreme Court declared that a court need only inquire
whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies
2 2
The
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."
there
that
test
danger
present
and
clear
requirement underlying the original
be incitement to unlawful action, and that there be a direct causal connection
between the regulated speech or publication and this action remains never23
It was this difficulty
theless inherent even in the Dennis formulation.
finding of a clear
legislature's
the
that forced the instant court to overrule
approach. But
Dennis
and present danger, and properly so, under the
involved
problem
the
although this requirement may be meaningful when
cataclysmis national security or unlawful political change, the essentially
focused perspective of the test makes it inapposite to the very different
problem of a possibly harmful psychological effect on young and untrained
minds-where there is the prospect of evitable and arguably serious harm
not necessarily accompanied by the production of immediate action.
Thus it has been recognized that irrespective of any clear and present
danger, certain utterences and types of publication are outside the area of

'8 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (restraint on commercial advertising); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (publications advocating violent
overthrow of the government) ; Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (advocation of nonassistance in the war effort).
17"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
's Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Neither an "inherent tendency"
nor a "reasonable tendency" to cause substantial evil is sufficient to justify a restriction of these rights. Id. at 272-73. For an analysis of the applications of the
rule, see Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 NoTRE DAME LAW.
325 (1952); Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52
COLUm. L. REv. 313 (1952).

19 Tucker v.Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Murdock v.Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943).
20 Fisher v.Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949) ; In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
21341 U.S. 494 (1951).
22
1d. at 510. This expression was coined by Judge Hand in the lower court
majority opinion inDennis. 183 F.2d at 212 (1950).
2
3The trial court inDennis charged that itwas the "teaching and advocacy of
action . . . by language reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite persons to
such action" that was forbidden, and that the language must be "reasonably and
ordinarily calculated to incite persons to such action . . . as speedily as circumstances would permit." 341 U.S. at 511-12.
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constitutional protection. 24 In Alberts v. California,25 the Supreme Court
sustained a conviction under state law 26 for keeping obscene and indecent
books for sale, holding that "obscenity" was not constitutionally protected
because utterly without redeeming social importance,2 7 and defining the
test of "obscenity" to be whether the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appealed to prurient interests of the average person, under contemporary community standards. 28 The Court seemed to say that since
obscenity as defined has no constitutional protection, it was unnecessary to
consider the clear and present danger doctrine; 29 perhaps a more satisfactory articulation is that where the nature of the benefits and detriments
of the material differs from form of expression to form of expression, the
constitutional inquiry also shifts. The Alberts rationale immediately
suggests a possible constitutional theory to sustain state regulation of the
distribution of crime comic books without difficulties of the clear and present
danger test; can it not be said that the distribution to children of crime
comic books, if properly defined, is without redeeming social worth? One
obstacle facing the Court in the Alberts case was the possibility that great
literature or books of educational merit would be suppressed as obscene, 30
yet the Court held obscenity as defined to be without constitutional protection. There would seem to be considerably less danger that the suppression
of crime comic books on the same basis would be detrimental to literary or
24

"There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (involved abusive language tending
to cause immediate breach of the peace). See Roth v.United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). But see Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948): "We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas ...
What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see nothing
of possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the
protection of free speech as the best of literature."
25 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
26 CAL. PEN. CODE §

311.

ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach
upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance." 354 U.S. at 484. See note 24 supra.
28 For an analysis of the obscenity situation before the Alberts case, see Lockhart
& McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MimN. L. REv.
295 (1954).
29
Accord, Beauharnais v.Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
30 In the Alberts case, see the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Warren, 354
U.S. at 495, and that of Harlan, J., id. at 498, and the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas,
id. at 509-10. See Note, Regulation of Comic Books, 68 HARv. L. REv. 489, 496, 504
(1955).
27 "All
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educational efforts of any importance. Although the widespread and increasing use of crime comic books 31 indicates an obvious entertainment
appeal, it seems unlikely that this kind of entertainment of children has any
such self-evident societal value as to convince a court that it merits preservation in the face of a contrary decision by the legislature.3 2 While it can be
argued that since crime comic books may have some legitimate entertainment value for adults who are mature enough to reject the fantastic and
accept the possible in the proper perspective,33 distribution of such publications to adults is not without redeeming social importance and would be
entitled to constitutional protection, nevertheless forbidding only the
dissemination of such material to children would not appear to be an unreasonable or arbitrary classification. 34
Clearly, however, religious publications, educational presentations in
comic form, and humorous-type comic books which present none of the
dangers feared should not be included in the definition of "crime comic
books." 35 But problems of differentiation would be eased if crime comic
books were defined as publications which, when viewed as a whole, mass
stories of crime, violence or lust in pictorial form in such a way as to glorify
crime, incite children to commit crimes, or create a preference in their
minds to participate in criminal acts. The standard to be applied in each
situation would be similar to that approved in Alberts-each publication
would be judged by its probable effect on an average child, applying contemporary community standards.36 Moreover, the forbidden act should be
the willful 3 7 dissemination of crime comic books to children, a requirement
31Id. at 489; Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Comic Books and Juvenile Delinquency, S. REP. No. 62, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1955) (Kefauver committee).
32No doubt many children would find obscenity equally entertaining.
33 See text accompanying note 38 infra.
34
1n re West, 313 Mass. 146, 46 N.E.2d 760 (1943) (statute forbade employment of minors in oiling or cleaning hazardous machinery in motion); People v.
Zabor, 183 N.Y. 242, 76 N.E. 17 (1905) (statute forbade sale of tobacco to minors) ;
Corey v. Kaufman & Chernick, Inc., 70 PI. 27, 36 A.2d 103 (1944) (statute forbade
sale of firearms or ammunition to minors); State v. Schull, 66 S.D. 102, 279 N.W.
241 (1938) (statute forbade sale of intoxicating liquor to minors). The age at which
the line should be drawn would appear to be a policy question for legislative determination, as long as within reason.
35 Compare the comic books described in Katzev v. County of Los Angeles,
336 P.2d 6, 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959), with those described id. at 13.
36 Such a standard takes into consideration the background and environment of
the children in the community, probably relevant to the effect such a comic book
would have on them.
37 This requirement was not an element of the offense in Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948), where the Court held a somewhat similar standard too vague
and indefinite. After pointing out that "no intent or purpose is required," 333 U.S.
at 519, the Court affirmed that "to say that a state may not punish by such a vague
statute carries no implication that it may not punish circulation of objectionable
printed matter, assuming that it is not protected by the principles of the First
Amendment, by the use of apt words to describe the prohibited publications." Id. at
520. (Emphasis added.) Chief Justice Warren emphasized this requirement in his
concurring opinion in the Alberts case, 354 U.S. at 494, 495.
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which would eliminate the objection based on vagueness, often raised if
potential wrongdoers are inadequately warned as to what is forbidden.38
One could hardly be heard to make such a complaint if a jury found, as
determined from all surrounding circumstances, that he had willfully distributed comic books of the forbidden type to children.39 Although it might
be argued that a statute applying the proposed standard attacks only the
distributors and secondary sources of such materials while allowing the
more serious wrongdoers, the publishers, to escape punishment, any regulation aimed directly at the publishers falls subject to the objection that it
will "reduce the adult population . . . to reading only what is fit for

children." 40 The Supreme Court has pointed out that where the class of
publication involved is not constitutionally protected, a legislative remedy
should be upheld if "not unrelated to the problem," 41 and it would seem
difficult to maintain that crime comic books are unrelated to the problem
of juvenile delinquency. 42 No doubt any application of the Alberts doctrine beyond "obscenity" is subject to possible abuse, as is the doctrine of
that case even within its narrowest sphere, 43 but this possibility is no reason
in itself for denying such an application.44 Following the lead of Alberts,
the legislature would be enabled to attempt a remedy for the ever-increasing
problem of juvenile delinquency 45 with minimal danger to expressions of
demanding social value.
38 Compare Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), and United
States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), with United States v. Spector,
343 U.S. 169 (1952), and Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337

(1952).

39 United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930) ; Ellis v. United States,
206 U.S. 246, 257 (1907). "The requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited
act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague
or indefinite statute invalid. . . . Where the punishment imposed is only for an act
knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which
he does is a violation of law. The requirement . . . may not render certain, for
all purposes, a statutory definition of the crime which is in some respects uncertain.
But it does relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes without warning an
offense of which the accused was unaware." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
101-02 (1945). See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), where the Court
held that scienter was an essential requirement under a statute forbidding the possession of obscene material. For a general discussion of the vagueness problem, see
Collings, Uncostitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955).
40 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
41
42

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952).
See note 10 supra and accompanying text.

43 Chief Justice Warren in his concurring opinion, 354 U.S. at 494, suggests
that whether a publication is obscene or not depends on who receives it and under
what conditions, i.e., that it is the conduct of the distributor that is governing, not
the publication itself. Such a perspective would shift the impact of Alberts, but there
seems nothing in it which would hamper interdiction of the distribution of crime
comic books to children.
44 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952).

45 See S. REP. No. 61, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1955); S. REP. No. 1064, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1954).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

754

LAW REVIEW

[VoI.108

CORPORATIONS-AmNDM-NT

TO Co RPo TE BY-LAws PROVIDING FOR NocumuI&TivE VOTING UEI. VOID AS R TGNANT TO
STATE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTE AND UNENFORCEABLE AS CON-

TRACT BECAUSE ENTERED INTO WITHIN CORPORATE STRUCTURE
Pursuant to a plan initiated at a meeting of its board of directors, the
management of defendant corporation appointed a committee to formulate
new by-laws, which were subsequently presented at an annual stockholders'
meeting and there adopted by unanimous vote of the stockholders present
in person or by proxy. Plaintiff, a director and the president of the corporation, voted for the amended by-laws at this meeting, including one
article which altered the manner of election of directors from cumulative to
straight voting. After a subsequent election, however, at which plaintiff
was denied the opportunity to cumulate his vote and all votes were counted
as straight ballots, he brought the instant suit to have the election declared
void and a new election directed. Under the authority of the Montana
constitution 1 and statute 2 requiring election of corporate directors by
cumulative voting, the Supreme Court of Montana held the by-law void
and inoperative, and further ruled that (1) although a contract among the
stockholders to vote noncumulatively would be valid and enforceable against
parties to it if made outside the corporate structure, (2) the by-law here
in issue would not be enforced as a contract because it had been entered
into directly within the framework of the corporate institution. Sensabaugh
v. Polson Plywood Co., 342 P.2d 1064 (Mont. 1959).
Unlike a contract, which is normally enforceable only against those
assenting to it, a corporate by-law binds all shareholders, notwithstanding
that they may have had no part in, or even resisted, its adoption.3 It is
generally held that where a by-law is invalid as such, as ultra vires or for
lack of some requisite formality, it may be enforced as a contract against
those who have given it their assent; 4 but if its substance is repugnant to
1

MoiT. CoNsT. art. XV, § 4 provides: "The legislative assembly shall provide

by law that in all elections for directors or trustees of incorporated companies,
every stockholder shall have the right to vote in person or by proxy the number of
shares of stock owned by him for as many persons as there are directors or trustees
to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as
the number of directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall equal,
or distribute them, on the same principle, among as many candidates as he shall think
fit, and such directors or trustees shall not be elected in any other manner."
2 MONT. REv. CoDE: ANN. § 15-405 (1947): "All elections must be by ballot,
and every stockholder shall have the right to vote in person or by proxy the number
of shares standing in his name . . . for as many persons as there are directors to
be elected, or to cumulate said shares and give one candidate as many votes as the
number of directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall equal, or
to distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates as he shall think
fit....
[T]he directors receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared
elected:'
3 Model Land & Irr. Co. v. Madson, 87 Colo. 166, 285 Pac. 1100 (1930);
Thistlethwaite v. Thistlethwaite, 200 Misc. 64, 101 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Monroe County
Ct. 1950) ; Quilliam v. Hebbronville Util., Inc., 241 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. 1951).
4In re American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 265 N.Y. 416, 193 N.E. 253 (1934),
with which compare In re Brophy 13 N.J. Misc. 462, 179 At. 128 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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some authoritative expression of public policy directed at a matter of
concern independent of the corporate institution as an institution, the
by-law will not be enforced in any form.5 State constitutional or statutory
provisions making mandatory the method of cumulative voting, in force
in twenty-three jurisdictions,6 are intended to secure minority interests
some quantum of representation on corporate boards.7 Attempts to circumvent such mandates and to eliminate the cumulative voting privilege
by amendment to the by-laws 8 or by resolution at stockholders' meetings 9
The doctrine as stated in 8 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4194 (rev. perm.

ed. 1931) is: "A by-law which is invalid and unenforceable as such may be enforceable as a contract against stockholders or members . . . who have accepted or
assented to it, except where it is beyond the power of the corporation to contract."
It has derived mainly from judicial treatment of by-laws restricting the alienability
of stock, Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Krauss v. Kuechler,
300 Mass. 346, 15 N.E.2d 207 (1938); New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass.
148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894); Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178
N.W. 957 (1920), but has also been applied to by-laws allocating voting power.
Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1953) ; Loewenthal
v. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 440, 28 Atl. 454 (Ch. 1894).
5 Kentucky Ass'n of Highway Contractors v. Williams, 213 Ky. 167, 280 S.W.
937 (1926) (restraint of competition) ; Constructor's Ass'n v. Seeds, 142 Pa. Super.
59, 15 A.2d 467 (1940) (same). With this class of case, compare Blue Mountain
Forest Ass'n v. Borrowe, 71 N.H. 69, 51 Atl. 670 (1901), where a by-law requiring
stockholders to share in the corporate deficit was enforced as a contract despite its
inconsistency with a state statute forbidding further assessment upon fully paid-in
shares.
6
ALAsKA ComP. LAws ANN. § 36-1-103 (1949); ARIZ. CoNsT. art. 14, § 10;
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-271 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-224 (1947); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 2235; HAWAII REV. LAws § 172-93 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-134
(1947) ; Ix- 'ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.28 (Smith-Hurd 1941) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-3303 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.315 (1959); MIc H. STAT. ANN. § 21.301
(1957); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5326 (1957); MO. CoNsT. art. 11, § 6; Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.245(3) (1952); MONT. CoNST. art. 15, § 4; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 15-405
(1947); NEB. CONsT. art. XII, § 5; NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-135 (1954); N.C. GEN.
STAT. 55-67 (1959); N.D. CONST. art. 7, § 135; N.D. REv. CODE § 10-0510 (1943);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.55 (Anderson Supp. 1959); PA. CONST. art. 16, § 4;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 103 (1958); S.C. CONsT. art. 9, § 11; S.C. CODE § 12-253
(1952) ; S.D. CONsT. art. XVII, § 5; WASH. REv. CODE § 2.3.32.070 (1955); W. VA.
CONsT. art. 11, §4; W. VA. CODE ch. 31, §3078 (1955); Wyo. Com-P. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-12 (1959). Eighteen other states have provisions permitting cumulative voting
if the corporation so elects. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-4 (1953); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 33-325 (1959); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§612.28 (1956); IND. ANN. STAT. §25-207(e) (1959); LA. REv. STAT. §12:32(B)
(1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §43(3) (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. §301.26(3)
(1945) ; Nrv. REv. STAT. § 78:360 (1957) ; N.J. REv. STAT. § 14:10-15 (1937) ; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 51-6-6 (1953); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAWS §§ 47, 49; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 168 (1951); ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.170(4) (1959); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN.
§7-4-2 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. §48-313 (1955); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.29 (Supp. 1959) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-32 (Supp. 1958).
For full discussion of the pros and cons of cumulative voting, and a history
of the constitutional enactments providing for this method of electing directors see
Campbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, Bus. Law.,
Apr. 1955, pp. 3, 15; Garrett, Attitudes on CorporateDemocracy-A CriticalAnalysis,
51 Nw. U.L. REv. 310, 324-27 (1956); Debate: Should Cumulative Voting for Directors be Mandatory?, Bus. Law., Nov. 1955, p. 9.
8
Commonwealth ex rel. Brant v. Garrett Water Co., 41 Pa. D. & C. 357 (C.P.
1941).
9
Wright v. The Central Cal. Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885) ; Tomlins
v. The Farmer's & Merchant's Bank, 52 Mo. App. 430 (1893).
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have been nullified by the courts, but few cases have considered the power
of shareholders to achieve the same ends by contract. Language in one
Colorado decision ' 0 seems to construe the legislative mandate as prohibiting
per se any form of agreement interfering with the right to vote cumulatively, but the contract there voided was one between the corporation itself
and another, independent corporation by which the latter was empowered
to select one member of the former's board of directors; and since that
contract did not run between the stockholders, as parties, and the outsiders, its enforcement would have had to operate, as to stockholders, on
nonconsensual principles. In the only authority directly on point, 1 the
Supreme Court of Nebraska recently sustained a contract between holders
of almost sixty and holders of forty per cent of the shares of a corporation
by which the parties agreed to vote all of their shares for the maintenance
of a four-man board of directors, two members to be selected respectively
by each of the contracting factions. This court interpreted its state's
organic and statutory cumulative-voting provisions as outlawing only such
negation of the right as was attempted by distinctly corporate establishments
(articles, by-laws directors' acts), not by private contract. But the close
corporation involved in the Nebraska litigation presented a situation in
which virtually all shareholders were contracting- parties and there were
correspondingly almost no unrepresented interests to be hurt,1 2 a fact
which may well have influenced the reasoning of the court.13 The instant
case, involving a widely held corporation, 14 more immediately poses the
issue as to how far stockholders may by contract override the statutory
proscription. 15
10 People ex rel. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet & Irrigated Land Co. v. Burke,
72 Colo. 486, 212 Pac. 837 (1923).
11E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954).
12The opinion is not altogether clear on this point. At most, sixty-three of
3000 shares were in the hands of noncontracting persons, see id. at 872, 62 N.W.2d at
294; and how these sixty-three became dissociated from the contractors in the course of
a transaction which was, in essence, the sale of a forty per cent interest in a previously
wholly-owned concern, is nowhere indicated. The court mentions the existence of
"a number" of dissociated shares, ibid., but appears to treat the case as one in which
only two sets of interests-those of the two contracting factions-are in any way
involved.
13 Unless the Nebraska court regarded the case essentially as one in which all
shareholders were contracting parties, its quotation with approval from State ex rel.
Frank v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561, 75-76, 89 S.W. 872, 876 (1905), that a constitutional provision regulating the nature of shareholder voting rights opposed no "prohibition or restriction on the right of stockholders to make their contracts which
violate no rule of the common law and which affect no rights, except their own"
completely begs the question.
14 Poison Plywood Company appears to have had 300,000 shares outstanding
at the time of litigation, and a stockholders' record that covered nine pages. Transcript on Appeal, p. 39, instant case.
15 For judicial recognition that, even for purposes of contract enforcement between the immediate parties, shareholder control agreements present different problems (1) where there exist minority stockholder- interests not privy to the agreement, and (2) where there exist no such interests. Compare Clark v. Dodge, 269
N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936), with McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189
N.E. 234 (1934).
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Inasmuch as, by definition, enforcement of such agreements becomes
an issue only when there has occurred a schism of previously allied factions,
judicial decision to hold the contracting parties bound will always affect
whatever noncontracting minority interests may exist, at least to the extent
of depriving those interests of the possible affiliation of the now disaffected
contracting shareholder. For this reason, to treat shareholder voting
compacts by ordinary contract principles, in the teeth of a statute whose
evident design is precisely to protect those minority interests-a statute
which embodies the policy decision that at any given election the then
extant minority requires the safeguard of the cumulative vote-seems unsound. Any presently continuing entente among a number of voting
shares sufficient to outweigh by straight vote a cumulatively voting splinter
minority poses no judicial problem; the question arises only when a present
member of such an entente attempts to disable himself from future disaffiliation, then wants to renege. Of course it is not for his sake that the
contract ought not be enforced,' 6 but because if it is enforced as to him the
existence at any point in time of a sufficiently large majority can stifle
cumulative voting within a particular corporation ad eternos: incorporators
leery of minority representation can initially take all the issued stock and
bind each other, first, to noncumulative voting and, second, to alienation of
shares only on condition that the transferee be similarly bound by contract.
Even though the secondary contracts might be held judicially to attach
only to the buyers, not to the shares, such contracts usually have most of
their effect as pressure instruments without ever coming before a court,
and inasmuch as the affected minority interests typically will be supine,
uninformed, and too little financially interested to wage the uphill fight to
unseat a directorate put in power by the original entente, the only hope of
making the cumulative voting provisions a meaningful reality against an
obdurate majority is to foster the schism which leads to litigation like that
which is here before the court. To encourage the breachor of such compacts
as an instrument for effective implementation of the almost inevitably silent
minority interests seems the soundest course. Nevertheless, if the dictum of the instant decision that private shareholder contracts may escape the constitutional and statutory bar against
noncumulative voting arrangements is accepted, the limitation with which
the case surrounds that doctrine seems well conceived. The "within the
corporation" test is not a mere formality, but, properly administered, can
serve the real function of guarding against the use of the corporate establishment itself by the presently controlling interests for the creation of institutions to perpetuate their control. Where the legislative determination has
been made that a minority requires protections because, as a minority, its
interests are likely to find inadequate reflection in the corporate machinery
16 Compare the court's subordination of the pari delicto doctrine to the principle
of using the wrongdoer as instrument of otherwise less adequately protected shareholder interests in, e.g., Duddy-Robinson Co. v. Taylor, 137 Wash. 304, 242 Pac. 21

(1926).
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controlled by a better positioned faction, any waiver of those protections
which is operated with the participation of that machinery is reasonably
suspect. It is a danger that management will have greater influence over
the small shareholder-by proxy control, use of the corporate letterhead,
support of the corporate treasury-and greater wealth of means to persuade
or beguile his assent, than it has solicitude for his security. It is to be
expected that courts in jurisdictions where constitutional or statutory cumulative voting provisions express a recognition of the dangers of a wholly
majority-controlled directorate will find in Sensabaugh precedent for avoiding minority loss of the cumulative voting right by contracts in whose
formation the corporate organization has played any part.

INCOME TAX-PERaNTAGE DEPLETION BASE OF GRoss INCOmE
FROM FINISHED PRODUCTS OF INTEGRATED TAXPAYER UPHELD AS
INCLUDING PROCESsEs NECESSARY To OBTAIN PROFITABLY SALABLE
MINERAL PRODUCT

Taxpayer, a corporate producer of vitrified sewer pipe and related
products from raw fire clay and shale which it mined, brought an action
to recover a refund of federal income taxes paid in 1951. It claimed a
deduction for depletion calculated as a percentage of gross income from
the finished products; the Government was willing to allow deduction based
only on a hypothetical gross income constructed upon representative field
or market price of the unprocessed minerals. During the year in question
there existed in taxpayer's state a substantial market for raw fire clay
and shale, but this was a buyer's market in which prices gravitated about
the selling offers of several low-cost strip mining operators, whereas most
of the producers in the region were, like taxpayer here, integrated--i.e.,
extracting-processing--concerns.
Taxpayer's own mineral source was
underground and at some distance from the nearest local market, and its
higher production costs, in combination with the heavy transportation cost
of shipping clay, precluded selling the unprocessed minerals at a profit. The
district court found the treatment processes applied by the taxpayer to be
ordinary ones normally applied by mine owners or operators to obtain commercially marketable mineral products, and held deduction on a finishedproducts base allowable.' The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
first-commercially-marketable-product test includes as mining all processes
necessary to obtain a mineral product which can be sold at a profit, and
rejecting the Government's further contention that even under this theory
the "first" product for any given mineral should be that one which, whether
or not actually produced by the taxpayer, represents the product most
I Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co. v. United States, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5277 (D. Ind.

1958).
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cheaply processed from the particular mineral.2 Cannelton Sewer Pipe
Co. v. United States, 268 F.2d 334 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 923
(1959) (No.513).
The idea of a deduction for depletion of natural resources antedates
even the first federal income tax statute under the sixteenth amendment,3
and although the Supreme Court has held that depletion is not an essential
deduction under the Constitution 4 most subsequent income tax laws have
contained depletion deduction provisions. 5 The Internal Revenue Code6
provides a general deduction for depletion: a reasonable allowance according to the peculiar conditions of each case, under rules prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate. 7 Another provisions specifically permits the
deduction to be calculated as a percentage of gross income from the property of producers of certain enumerated minerals,9 and under the statutory
2Under this conception there is one depletable product per mineral, typified, in
the court's words, as "the common denominator represented by a conceivable product
most cheaply produced from each mineral." Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co. v. United
States, 268 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 923 (1959) (No. 513).
Here the Government suggested that the depletable might be common brick or ground
fire clay.
3 See 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON [hereinafter cited as MERTENS]

§§ 24.05-.06 (1954); compare Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, B, 38 Stat. 167 (as
to individuals) and § II, G(b), 38 Stat. 172 (as to corporations).
4 Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916).
5 See 1 SEIDMAx, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INcomE TAx LAws, 19531939, at 1363 (1954); 4 MERTENS §§ 24.05-.15(b).
6 Although the cases dealt with in this Comment involve interpretations of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 114(b) (4), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 45, as amended, ch. 521,
§ 319, 65 Stat. 497 (1951), the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is substantially the
same as the earlier law for present purposes. Parallel citations to the two will be
set out throughout this Comment.
7 IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 611(a); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(m), ch. 1, 53
Stat. 12. The rationale of a deduction for depletion is that a return of capital
investment should not be taxed as ordinary income, 4 MERTENS § 24.02 n.5 and accompanying text, and is analogous to the accounting concept that the consumption of
capital assets must be deducted from current income to show a true picture of economic gain. Like depreciation it recognizes that a wasting asset represents a current
cost of doing business.
8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613(a) ; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 114(b) (4), ch. 1,
53 Stat. 45, as amended, ch. 521, § 319, 65 Stat. 497 (1951).
9 Percentage depletion is wholly a creature of the tax statutes and is only remotely related to the economic or geologic concepts of depletion. It may provide an
incentive to develop resources despite the often great risk factor in the mineral producing industries. See White & Brainerd, Percentage Depletion of Minerals-A
Costly Study in Definitions, 34 TAxEs 97, 98 (1956). See also Macleod, Percentage
Depletion Controversy, J. Accountancy, Feb. 1955, pp. 40-45. This incentive is
most apparent in the case of oil and gas producers, who are entitled to a twentyseven and one-half per cent depletion deduction. Another claimed benefit of the percentage depletion scheme is its relative simplicity of calculation, see United States v.
Merry Bros. Brick & Tile Co., 242 F.2d 708, 711 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
824 (1957); see also Hobbet & Donaldson, Percentage Depletion for Minerals,
37 TAXES 477, 479-80 (1959); Macleod, mupra at 44, although of course troubling
interpretive problems do arise. From its inception the idea has been fraught with
controversy, objectors decrying the giving of an ofttimes large subsidy to particular
industries. See 4 MERTENS § 24.04 n.14 and accompanying text. See also Baker &
Griswold, Percentage Depletion--A Correspondence, 64 H.Av. L. Rnv. 361 (1951);
Note, 20 U. Pirr. L. R!v. 155, 157-58 (1958).
Since its first appearance in the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 204(c) (2), 44
Stat. 16, the percentage depletion deduction has been made increasingly more avail-
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definition of "gross income from the property" 10 the courts have assigned as a proper basis for deduction the gross income from the producer's first commercially marketable mineral product or products, even if
the product might be one normally considered to be a manufacture, so long
as the processes applied to it are those ordinarily applied by mine owners
or operators to make such a product."- When two or more commercially
marketable products are produced, the taxpayer is entitled to a depletion
deduction computed on the gross income from all the finished products save
the ones that are merely a further refinement of an already commercially
marketable product.' 2 Should he, choose to process the mineral beyond
the first stage at which it would be commercially marketable his deduction
able by Congress, and the present Code allows producers of almost every mineral
resource to take it. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613(b). The percentage deduction may not amount to more than fifty per cent of net taxable income (calculated
without allowance for depletion), but in no case need the taxpayer take percentagecomputed deduction where it would garner him less than a deduction calculated by
the "cost" method pursuant to Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(m)-2 (1949).
Under the
latter alternative, the depletion deduction is arrived at by dividing the adjusted basis
of the property by the estimated number of units of mineral remaining as of the
taxable year, and then multiplying the depletion unit by the number of units sold
during the tax year. For accounting purposes depletion is usually computed by the
cost method, although percentage depletion is sometimes used. However, cost is used
for tax purposes only when it produces a higher deduction than percentage. It is
no longer necessary to elect between the two. Goulette, Depletion for Tax Purposes:
A Condensed Picture of How It Works in Mining, 4 J. TAXATION 258, 259 (1956).
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 114(b) (4) (B), added by ch. 63, § 124(c), 58 Stat.
45 (1944), as amended. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613(c), which is identical for these
purposes, provides: "(1) Gross income from the property. The term 'gross income
from the property' means, in the case of a property other than an oil or gas well,
the gross income from mining. (2) Mining. The term 'mining' includes not merely
the extraction of the ores or minerals from the ground but also the ordinary treatment processes normally applied by mine owners or operators in order to obtain the
commercially marketable product or products, and so much of the transportation of
ores or minerals (whether or not by common carrier) from the point of extraction
from the ground to the plants or mills in which the ordinary treatment processes
are applied thereto as is not in excess of 50 miles unless the Secretary or his delegate
finds that . . . the ore or mineral must be transported a greater distance to such
plants or mills." Subsection (4) provides that the term ordinary treatment processes
"includes" a number of specified operations listed for each of several enumerated
minerals, none here relevant.
11 See Dragon Cement Co. v. United States, 244 F.2d 513 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 833 (1957) (equates term "mineral product" with manufactured product
of a mineral) ; Cherokee Brick & Tile Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 59 (D. Ga.
1954), aff'd, 218 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1955) (refuses to exclude manufacturing processes not otherwise excluded by Code) ; International Talc Co., 15 T.C. 981 (1950)
(contains initial reference to "first commercially marketable product").
See also
United States v. Merry Bros. Brick & Tile Co., 242 F.2d 708 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 824 (1957); United States v. Sapulpa Brick & Tile Corp., 239 F.2d 694
(10th Cir. 1956) ; Townsend v. Hitchcock Corp., 232 F.2d 444 (4th Cir. 1956).
12 Compare United States v. Sapulpa Brick & Tile Corp., supra note 11 (brick
and tile), and Townsend v. Hitchcock Corp., supra note 11 (pulverized talc and
talc crayons), and United States v. Cherokee Brick & Tile Co., 218 F.2d 424 (5th
Cir. 1955) (brick and tile), and Richland Shale Prods. Co. v. United States, 168
F. Supp. 731 (D.S.C. 1958) (brick, sewer pipe, drain tile, flue linings and wall
copings), and Arvonia-Buckingham Slate Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 903
(D. Va. 1958) (shingles, flagstones and rubble), with Sparta Ceramic Co. v. United
States, 168 F. Supp. 401 (D. Ohio 1958) (unglazed tile, but not glazed tile), and
Black Mountain Corp., 21 T.C. 746 (1954) (various sizes of coal, but not oil-treated
coal).
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is based on gross income as measured by the representative market or field
13
price of a mineral product of like kind and grade processed to that stage.
If there is no such representative price the basis is the gross income from his
finished product, f.o.b. plant, less that proportion of the income attributable
to the additional processing. 14 What the first commercially marketable
product is in a given case and whether the treatment processes applied in
its production are ordinary ones are treated as questions of fact. 15
The instant decision is a step in a continuing process of judicial expansion of that category of mining-connected operations whose products
will base a deduction under the Code.' 0 In the landmark case of United
States v. Cherokee Brick & Tile Co.,17 the Fifth Circuit rejected the Government's attempt to exclude all manufacturing processes not specifically
enumerated by the statute,'3 and established the rule, since universally
followed, 19 that gross income for depletion deduction may derive from the
selling price of an end product where no market for the mineral exists at
any stage between extraction and loading for shipment of that finished
product.2 0 But because the United States admitted in Cherokee the nonexistence of any such "market," that court had no need for more precise
definition, and was satisfied to gloss the Code term "commercially marketable" as "marketable in commerce." 21 Thus the question as to whether
13 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-1 (f) (1949). Similar directions are contained in
See Alabama By-Prods. Corp. v.
Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(m)-l(e)(3) (1953).
Patterson, 258 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 930 (1959).
14 bid. This is the "proportionate profits" method of computing gross income.
15 See United States v. Cherokee Brick & Tile Co., 218 F.2d 424 (5th Cir.
1955).
16 A host of cases following close on the heels of the instant case cite it with
approval. E.g., Commissioner v. Iowa Limestone Co., 269 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1959) ;
Eastvale Clay Prods. Co. v. United States, CCH 1960 STAND. FED. TAX REPT. (59-2
U.S. Tax Cas.) 19682 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 1959); Dixie Fire Brick Co. v. United
States, CCH 1960 STAND. FED. TAX REPT. (59-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 19625 (N.D. Ala.
July 29, 1959); Standard Clay Mfg. Co. v. United States, CCH 1960 STAND. FED.
TAX REPT. (59-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 119585 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 1959); Albin C.
Halquist, 33 T.C. No. 36 (Nov. 25, 1959).
17218 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1955), affirming 122 F. Supp. 59 (D. Ga. 1954).
18 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 613(c) (4); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 114(b)
(4) (B), added by ch. 63, § 124(c), 58 Stat. 45 (1944), as amended. See note 10
supra for the structure of the statutory provision.
19 The only divergent decision, Dragon Cement Co. v. United States, 144 F.
Supp. 188 (D. Me. 1956), was reversed by the First Circuit, 244 F.2d 513, cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 833 (1957), which adopted the Cherokee rule.
20 But the Internal Revenue Service did not accede to the Cherokee decision until
recently, apparently because the revenue loss involved was considered too substantial to
warrant immediate acquiescence. See Rev. Rul. 244, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 73; Note, 20
U. PxiT. L. REv. 155, 163 n.44 (1958). The argument of lost revenues has, however,
been given short shrift by the courts. E.g., United States v. Merry Bros. Brick &
The
Tile Co., 242 F.2d 708, 712 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957).
Government did not attempt to resurrect this line of attack in the instant case.
21218 F.2d at 425. The court rested its affirmance "mainly" on the ground that
it was uncontested that there was a market for only a negligible quantity of brick
and tile clay mined in the United States. Ibid. Townsend v. Hitchcock Corp., 232
F.2d 444 (4th Cir. 1956), also seems to regard a commercially marketable product
as one for which a commercial market exists. Id. at 446.
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and to what extent the market which marked the end of the depletableproduct stage had to be available under the circumstances of the particular
producer's operations was not squarely presented until Sparta Ceramic Co.
v. United States.22 There, choosing to look rather to the situation of the
individual taxpayer than to the industry-wide picture, the district court
held that a taxpayer's product was not commercially marketable unless it
was economically feasible for him to sell it in a commercial market.23 This
conception, seemingly grounded on the notion that a producer should have
a meaningful chance to sell in lieu of further processing before continued
operation is treated as a source of nondepletable income, already goes beyond the theory of Cherokee, where the district court, at least, explained
the commercially-marketable-product test in terms of the choice by Congress
of the earliest stage at which an objective economic index of mining
product-worth became available. 24 In the instant case and in Sparta,however, there existed an earlier stage at which worth could be gauged than
that at which the courts permitted the depletion deduction: there was a
substantial market for the raw mineral itself and an established price at
which it was in fact marketed in commerce. Moreover, if its sale-at-a-profit
language be read literally, the instant case goes even beyond the economic-

feasibility principle articulated in Sparta.25 Economic feasibility, even from
the perspective of the particular producer, may mean a variety of things:
it may militate for sale at, or sometimes even below, cost in order to recover
a contribution toward fixed operating costs, 26 or to boost volume to cut
unit cost, or merely to stay in the market sufficiently long to reap long-run
gains. And "feasibility" is in any event a judgment, susceptible of judicial
reexamination. But sale at a profit means just that-an excess of revenue over cost for present product. Since cost at all levels of production will
22 168 F. Supp. 401 (D. Ohio 1958).
23 The court also rejected as without merit the Government's alternative contention that the deduction be based on the hypothetical sales of common brick, a
product that the taxpayer did not produce and, in fact, could not produce on a commercial basis. An analogous, although differently focussed, "least processing" argument was also rejected in the instant case and in the cases cited note 16 stpra.
Seemingly the concept is applicable on two different levels with two very different
results: it may refer to the product which with least processing the industry can
sell at a profit (one-depletable-product-per-mineral theory), or the product which
the individual producer, given his particular costs, could with least processing sell
at a profit. The latter standard would of course pose extraordinarily difficult administrative problems.
24 122 F. Supp. at 63-64. This concept, however, would seem difficult to reconcile
with the Commissioner's regulations governing the calculation of income in situations
where a representative price is not available. See text accompanying note 14 vrpra.
Query also how easy it is to reconcile with the allowance in Cherokee of a deduction
computed on income from the sales of two different products-brick and tile. Unless
these two are on a par of "rawness" or "least processing"-ness (which inquiry serves
to point out the factual difficulties inherent in that test), this allowance may in fact
constitute Cherokee an authority against the Government's single-product-per-mineral
thesis.
25 Compare the court's emphasis on "a product which can be sold by it at a profit,"
instant case at 336 (original emphasis), with the formulation in Sparta, "substantial
sales with the possibility of a profit." 168 F. Supp. at 404.
26 This is the theory behind by-product accounting.
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depend in part on fixed overhead of the total enterprise as allocated, the
producer who elects to engage in extensive post-extraction processing can,
under the at-a-profit rule, to a certain extent raise by his own bootstraps
the stage at which his product becomes "commercially marketable" and
thus depletable.
If this line of decision is justifiable, it would seem to be on the ground
of greater incentive to the integrated mineral producer. Indeed, the
cogency of that argument is most apparent on the facts of the instant case,
where evidence showed that the sellers who made the raw-mineral market
price were either coal-mining concerns which strip-mined underclay as a
by-product or independent clay strip-miners who followed and cleaned up
after coal extraction operations-producers with less capital investment in
fire clay, and who worked on more exhaustible clay resources, than the
integrated processors like Cannelton. But a strong countervailing consideration is the consequent disparity of tax treatment as between the independent strip miner and Cannelton (who takes depletion deduction on
a product of ten or twenty times the value of the raw mineral sold by the
stripper), and as between Cannelton and the competing processor who
purchases raw fire clay from the stripper for the manufacture of vitrified
pipe. 27 From this viewpoint, deduction on income from the finished product discriminates among competitors and, to an extent, subsidizes the highcost enterprise.28
Urging especially arguments of tax inequality among producers within
a single mineral industry and enormity of revenue losses,2 9 the Government
is presently pressing for acceptance of its "least processing" (one depletable
product per mineral) theory by the Supreme Court, which has granted
certiorari in the instant case. What is sought is a definition of "commercially marketable product" which will allow the courts to draw the
line of depletion deduction availability at an industry-wide level. This
result might be achieved by an affirmatively limiting annunciation of the
"marketable in commerce" principle which may have been the concept
27 Cannelton's deduction is, however, limited to fifty per cent of net taxable
income. INT. RE. CODE OF 1954, § 613 (a) ; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 114(b) (4) (A),
ch. 1, 53 Stat. 45, as amended, ch. 521, § 319, 65 Stat. 497 (1951).
28This is best demonstrated by the situation in which, as between two minermanufacturers, A and B, A can produce the raw mineral at a cost that Would enable
him to compete in an existing raw mineral market, whereas B, for reasons of higher
mining costs (inefficiency or otherwise), cannot sell the raw mineral at a profit.
All other production costs to identical finished products being equal and there being
a firm market price for the finished products, A should reap a slightly higher profit
(gross and net) than B. But A's depletion deduction is based on the gross income
from the market price of the raw mineral, and B's is based on the gross income
from the more valuable finished product. Depending on the difference between the
bases it might be possible for B to wind up with a substantially greater net income than A.
29 The Government contends that if the principle declared in the instant case
were to be applied to the claims already pending administratively or in the courts
the loss would approximate $297,000,000. A general application for current and
future tax years would produce a loss "conservatively estimated" at about $598,000,000
yearly. Petition for Certiorari, pp. 7-8, 39-40.
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underlying Cherokee 0-oa rule eschewing inquiry into profitability to the
individual taxpayer. Such an approach would of course leave the serious
administrative problems of determining precisely what constitutes a market
and what product is the lowest common denominator for an industry.31
Perhaps a better resolution is to treat the existence of a geographically
accessible market and a representative market price for some "least processed" mineral as a question of fact to be proved by the Government before
the taxpayer's claimed refined-product basis is disallowed. Although this
method would not achieve industry-wide equality, it would result in equal
treatment at least among all the (probably competitive) producers in a
32
given region.
30 But

see note 24 .supra.

also notes 23, 24 supra.
Depletion regulations under the 1954 Code have been recently adopted except
the ones pertaining to §§ 613(b), (c), & (d) from which the Commissioner is withholding final approval pending the outcome of the Cannelton litigation. T.D. 6446,
1960 INT. Rv. BULL. No. 6, at 24. Congress too has been asked to reexamine the
Code's treatment of the depletion deduction problems here discussed. In his first
statement to the House Ways and Means Committee on January 16, 1958, Secretary
of the Treasury Anderson expressed dissatisfaction with the decisions in the clay
depletion cases and recommended that the law be revised. Hearings Pertaining to
the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Ways and
Means Committee, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1097-98 (1958). The Treasury Department
has presented a set of proposed changes which would do away with the first-commercially-marketable-product test altogether and greatly reduce the scope of the
term "mining," see note 10 mipra, by express exclusion of all processing operations
not statutorily enumerated. See Hobbet & Donaldson, .spra note 9, at 487 n.16.
Opposition to these proposals has focused not on the articulated aim espoused by the
Department-prevention of revenue loss-but on the method by which that aim is
31 Consider

32

sought to be accomplished; alternatively, an across-the-board reduction of the respective percentage rates for the various minerals is recommended. Note, 20 U. PirrT.
L. REv. 155, 170 (1958).
See Hobbet & Donaldson, .supra note 9, at 491. This
would preserve "simplicity" of calculation and would leave untouched the background
of existing case law; dearly, it would also preserve the possibility of unequal treatment
of similar taxpayers. The House Committee held discussions on proposed percentage
depletion legislation last year, 37 TAXES 1055 (1959), but is also awaiting the Supreme
Court's edict in the instant case before it will consider recommending a change to
the Code. 38 TAXES 169 (1960).
There is, in any event, considerable doubt as to
whether Congress, which has over the years displayed much reluctance to effect
reduction in the percentage depletion rates or bases, see Note, 20 U. PiTt. L. REv.
155, 170 & n.45 (1958), would now consider such an alternative.

